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IS HUMAN CAPITAL LOSING FROM 
OUTSOURCING? 





Feenstra and Hanson (1997) have argued in the context of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement that US outsourcing to Mexico leads to an increase in the skill premium in both 
the US and Mexico. In this paper we show on the example of Austria and Poland that with the 
new international division of labour emerging in Europe Austria, the high income country, is 
specializing in the low skill intensive part of the value chain and Poland, the low income 
country, is specializing in the high skill part. As a result, skilled workers in Austria are losing 
from outsourcing, while gaining in Poland. In Austria, relative wages for human capital 
declined by 2 percent during 1995-2002 and increased by 41 percent during 1994-2002 in 
Poland. In both countries outsourcing contributes roughly 35 percent to these changes in the 
relative wages for skilled workers. Furthermore, we show that Austria's R&D policy has 
contributed to an increase in the skill premium there. 
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Paper prepared for the CESifo Venice Summer Institute 2005 “Recent Developments in 
International Trade: Globalization and the Multinational Enterprise”. 1 Introduction
The debate about globalization has shifted recently to a new frontier. Firms in rich
countries are seen to outsource white color workers to India, China, and to Eastern
Europe raising fears that this will adversely aﬀect the long run growth potential
of industrialized economies and will result in an increase in unemployment of high
skilled workers in Europe and in a decline in the skill premium in the US.1 In a
previous paper, Marin (2004) has shown that German and Austrian ﬁrms oﬀshore
the skill intensive stages of production to Eastern Europe relocating high skilled
jobs to this region. She ﬁnds that German aﬃliates in Eastern Europe are on
average almost 3 times as skill intensive compared to their parent companies in
Germany. The skill intensity of the oﬀ-shoring activity of Austrian ﬁrms is slightly
above that of the activity of parent ﬁrms in Austria.
In this paper we examine empirically whether outsourcing to New Europe has
hurt skilled workers in Old Europe and has beneﬁted workers in New Europe.2
Figure 1 gives the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the last decade in Germany
and Austria on the one hand and in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
on the other. We use as a proxy for the skill wage ratio relative wages of non-
production to production workers. The data show a strong increase in the relative
wage for skills in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while this ratio appears
to have remained almost constant in Germany and Austria.3
These wage data do not show a pattern of factor prices that trade economists
usually expect from trade and investment integration. Typically, when a skill rich
country like Germany (relative to Poland) integrates with a skill poor country like
Poland, we expect relative wages for skills to go up in Germany and to decline
in Poland. The reason is that trade integration leads a country to specialize in
those sectors which use the country’s abundant factor intensively. Thus, skill rich
Germany specializes in the skill intensive sectors and labor rich Poland specializes
in labor intensive sectors. As a result the relative demand for skills goes up in
Germany and declines in Poland leading to an increase in the relative wage for
skills in Germany and to a decline of those in Poland.
Why have relative wages for skilled workers increased in New Europe and
remained somewhat constant in Old Europe? Why do we observe a perverse
Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect in these countries? We explore these questions on the
example of two countries from Old and New Europe: Austria and Poland. Austria
1 The last Brookings Trade Forum in 2005 is devoted to the theme of Outsourcing of
White Collar Workers.
2For the New International Division of Labor in Europe, see Marin (2006).
3For an explanation of the evolution of the skill premium in Germany, see Marin and
Raubold (2005).




























Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Statistic Austria, Central Statistical Oﬃce of Poland
and PAIiIZ.
and Poland are no natural pair to consider. Although Austria’s foreign direct
investment to Poland accounts for 10.4 percent of total outgoing Austrian FDI to
Eastern Europe in 2002-2004 and has shown a tremendous increase in the last ten
years (see Table 1), Austria’s share in total incoming FDI in Poland is negligible
(see Table 1). Still, we choose these two countries, because Poland is the largest
country in New Europe and Austria is the country in Old Europe most integrated
with New Europe. The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEE) account
for 58 percent of total outgoing FDI in Austria in 2002-2004 (see Table 1).4
Table 2 takes a closer look at outsourcing in selected countries and the devel-
opment in their labor markets. With an annual growth rate of the skill wage ratio
of 4.4 percent, Poland shows the strongest increase in the skill premium since the
announcement of Eastern Enlargement. Compared to Poland, Mexico’s increase
in the relative wage for skills appears to be small in face of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The annual increase in the skill premium in
Germany and the US are of the same order of magnitude, while Austria’s skill
premium declined modestly. At the same time, Austria and Poland experienced a
sharp increase in outsourcing between 1995 and 2002. In both countries outsourc-
ing has grown annually by 6 and 7 percent, respectively. This can also bee seen
from Figure 2 which shows that the measure for outsourcing in Austria (the share
of imported inputs in percent of output) increased from 20 percent in 1990 to 30
percent in 2000, while remaining constant over the previous decade. In Poland
4 In 2003 CEE accounted for 88% of total outgoing FDI in Austria, while only for 4%
in Germany (see Marin, Lorentowicz and Raubold (2003)).
2Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment Pattern in Austria and Poland
Austria’s outgoing FDI Poland’s incoming FDI
1992-1994 2002-2004 1994-1996 2001-2003
CEE 33.83 58.00 7.86 19.07 France
Hungary 18.03 10.93 21.07 10.74 USA
Czech Rep. 9.87 7.19 14.27 13.94 Germany
Poland 0.59 10.40 7.81 18.08 Netherlands
Croatia 1.00 6.36 4.79 9.22 UK
Slovak Rep. 1.53 3.10 10.37 2.15 Italy
Slovenia 2.00 3.86 3.16 5.21 Sweden
Romania 0.18 10.35 0.51 7.96 Belgium
Russia 0.15 1.15 2.33 4.11 Denmark
Bulgaria 0.23 1.35 0.00 0.00 Russia
EU-15 35.24 28.30 1.07 0.45 Ireland
Germany 9.66 10.30 3.33 1.83 Switzerland
UK 6.67 3.52 1.31 -1.01 Austria
other 30.93 13.69 21.48 10.32 other
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 total
Notes: The numbers show the percentage distribution of foreign direct investment ﬂows.
Countries are ranked according their average (1992-2004 for Austria and 1994-2003 for
Poland) importance as source and as host country, respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Austrian National Bank, OeNB, and the
Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency, PAIiIZ.
the measure of outsourcing (foreign assets in percent of domestic assets) increased
from 4 to 80 percent between 1994 and 2002. Thus, outsourcing is a candidate for
explaining the evolution of the skill premia in both countries.5
This paper explores the role of outsourcing for the decline in the skill premium
in Austria and for the increase of the skill premium in Poland. In Section 2 and
Section 3 we develop the theoretical framework and its empirical implementation
along the lines of Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1997) who have argued that the
increase in the skill premium in the US as well as in Mexico in face of NAFTA
can be explained by capital movements in the form of foreign direct investment
from the US to Mexico. US multinationals started to outsource the labor intensive
5For the determinants of outsourcing see Marin (2006).
3Table 2: Outsourcing and Labor Market Outcomes in Selected Countries
Poland Austria Germany USA Mexico
1994-2002 1995-2002 1990-2000 1979-1990 1975-1988
outsourcing 6.91c 6.01d - 4.67e 17.60f
relative wagesa 4.42 -0.29 0.71 0.72g 1.39h
relative employmenta 1.22 1.97 2.01 - -
high-skilled workers’ wage shareb 3.74 1.14 1.56 1.27 1.50h
a non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and Mexico, in
mining and manufacturing for Austria
b (non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production
workers)/((non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production work-
ers)+(production to production workers’ wage*number of production to production workers)) in man-
ufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and Mexico, in mining and manufacturing for Austria
c 1+(foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic ﬁxed assets), manufacturing
d narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing: (imported inputs from own sector/value added of sector)*100,
mining and manufacturing
e (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manufacturing
f incoming FDI / total ﬁxed investment
g weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing shipments
h for US-Border region only, manufacturing
Source: Poland, Austria and Germany: own calculations; USA: data from Feenstra and Hanson (1996b);
Mexico: data from Feenstra and Hanson (1997).
stages of production to Mexico. The so called maquiladoras emerged in Mexico.
Maquiladoras are aﬃliates of US multinationals in Mexico which specialize in the
low skill intensive part of the value chain. US multinationals’ outsourcing activities
to Mexico leads relative wages for skills to increase in the US as well as Mexico.
The increase in the skill premium in Poland and its decline in Austria suggests
that an inverse maquiladoras eﬀect is emerging in Austria and Poland. Austrian
ﬁrms are outsourcing the more skill intensive stages of production to Eastern
Europe and specializing in the more labor intensive stages of production in Austria
leading to a decline in the skill premium in Austria.6 Poland on the other hand is
receiving outsourcing of multinational activities from more skill rich countries like
the US, the Netherlands, and France resulting in an increase in the skill premium
in Poland. Section 4 examines whether such an inverse maquiladoras eﬀect can
be identiﬁed for Austria and whether the decline in the skill premium in Austria
can be attributed to outsourcing. Section 5 then examines whether multinational
outsourcing has been contributing to the increase in the skill premium in Poland.
Section 6 concludes.
6Marin (2004) shows that Austria is poor in skills relative to Eastern Europe.
4Figure 2: Outsourcing in Austria and Poland
1 non-production workers' wage to production workers' wage
2 manufacturing and mining
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1Domestic and imported inputs in percent of output, manufacturing and mining.
2Foreign ﬁxed assets relative to domestic ﬁxed assets, manufacturing.
Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Statistic Austria, Central Statistical Oﬃce
of Poland and PAIiIZ.
2 The Framework
In the Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) model, the world economy consists of two
countries: North and South. Each country is endowed with three factors of pro-
duction: capital, high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor. These endowments are
assumed to be suﬃciently diﬀerent so that factor prices are not equalized. Returns
to capital and the relative wage of high-skilled labor are assumed to be higher in the
South, reﬂecting a relative scarcity of capital and high-skilled labor in the South.
Initially, there is no international factor mobility, but labor mobility between skill
categories within each country. In other words, the supply of skilled and unskilled
workers can react to changes in the relative wages. On the production side there
is a single ﬁnal good assembled from a continuous range of intermediate inputs
at no additional cost. These inputs are produced using all factors and diﬀer only
with regard to the relative amounts of high-skilled and low-skilled labor engaged
in their production since capital enters the production function with the same cost
share for all inputs. They are indexed by z ∈ [0,1] and ranked in a way that
high-skilled labor intensity is increasing with z. Assuming that for constant wages
the minimum cost of producing one unit of input is a continuous function of z and
that all inputs are produced in both countries, Figure 3 depicts the minimum cost
locus for intermediate goods produced in the North ( CNCN) and in the South
(CSCS).
z∗ is deﬁned as the ”cutoﬀ intermediate input” where the minimum production
cost in the South and the North is equal. CSCS lies below CNCN to the left of








Figure 3: Outsourcing from the North to the South.
z∗ since the relative wage of low-skilled labor, which is relatively intensive used
in the production of these inputs, is lower in the South. The opposite holds for
intermediates lying to the right of z∗. Thus, the South has a cost advantage in
producing inputs, which are relatively low-skilled labor intensive and the North
has a cost advantage producing inputs which are relatively high-skill intensive.
The following trade pattern emerges: the South exports intermediate goods in the
range z ∈ [0,z∗) while the North exports those in the range z ∈ (z∗,1].
What will happen in the model if Northern ﬁrms are allowed to invest in the
South? They will have an incentive to do so in order to earn the higher returns to
capital in the South. The ﬂow of capital from the North to the South will cause a
reduction in the Southern return to capital and an increase in return to capital in
the North. Consequently, at constant wages, this change will alter the minimum
cost loci shown in Figure 3. CSCS will move down and CNCN up increasing the
critical value of z∗ to z0. That is, the production of inputs in range [z∗,z0) now will
take place in the South rather than in the North. In other words, in the South, the
range of intermediate production will spread toward inputs that engage a higher
ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor. The inputs, which still will be produced
in the North, will use a higher ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor relative to
those that will leave. Therefore, both countries will experience an increase in the
average skill intensity of production and an increase in the relative demand for
high-skilled labor. As a result, the relative wage of skilled labor will rise in both
countries. Summing up, z∗ is increasing with the Southern to Northern capital
ratio. Thus, the relative wage of skilled workers will be positively aﬀected by
accumulation of capital in the South relative to the North. Feenstra and Hanson
6(1996a) show that this result also holds for exogenous relative capital accumulation
in the South not necessarily caused by Northern ﬁrms’ investment.
Following Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996a) interpretation of the model, the ac-
tivities which are outsourced by industrialized countries to developing countries
are relatively low-skilled from the perspective of the home country and relatively
high-skilled for the host country. Thus, outsourcing increases the relative demand
for high-skilled workers in both countries resulting in a higher relative wage for
high-skilled labor.
3 The Empirical Model
The model of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) provides a formalization of the idea
that outsourcing induces a shift in the factor intensities in domestic and foreign
production. As described in the previous section, the countries are - by assumption
- endowed with three factors of production: low-skilled labor, high-skilled labor
and capital. In the production process these three factors are combined, which
leads to the following unit variable cost function for each sector i and for each




We include in addition to the factor prices wLS, wHS and rit two variables: out-
sourcing (OUTSOURC) and technical change (TECH). Following the existing
literature, the inclusion of outsourcing as well as technical progress in the unit cost
function is justiﬁed by arguing that merely including the factors of production will
not capture other factors which might inﬂuence the production costs. In this con-
text outsourcing can be thought as a form of technical change since it acts as an
“endogenous technical change”.7
Berman et al (1994) suggested that a translog cost function can be derived
from the unit cost function. Assuming capital as a ﬁxed factor of production, the
diﬀerentiation of the translog cost function with respect to the prices of the variable
factors, wLS and wHS, gives the factor demand equation in the form of the factor’s
share in total variable cost. In our analysis the factor’s share in total variable cost
is deﬁned as the high-skilled workers’ wage bill in the total wage bill. This wage
bill share of the high-skilled workers (WBSHS) measures the relative demand for
high-skilled labor. From this we receive the following estimating equation:
WBSHS
it = β0 + β1lnYit + β2lnKit + β3OUTSOURCit
+ β4TECHit + uit (2)
7 See Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).
7The dependent variable in this equation is a composite measure. It incorporates
relative wages of non-production workers as well as their relative employment.
4 Outsourcing in Austria
In this section we analyze the consequences of increased competition due to im-
ported intermediate goods for the Austrian labor market. Particularly, we want
to address the question of how international outsourcing aﬀects the demand for
high-skilled labor in Austria. What is an appropriate measure of this competition
in imported inputs? In the existing literature, there are two deﬁnitions known
that use the data of input-output tables: wide and narrow deﬁnitions of outsourc-
ing. The wide deﬁnition refers to the intermediate goods that a particular sector
imports from all sectors all over the world. In contrast, the narrow deﬁnition of
outsourcing is related just to the imported inputs from the ﬁrm’s own sector. The
reasoning for favoring the latter deﬁnition is that the workers of a particular sector
might be solely aﬀected by decisions of ﬁrms at the sectoral level over “make or
buy” inputs.8 Firms of a particular sector are not able to produce inputs that
they buy from other sectors. Therefore, the factor intensities and the demand for
high-skilled labor should not be aﬀected by the decision if inputs from other sec-
tors are sourced domestically or from abroad. In this paper we will use therefore
the narrow deﬁnition of international outsourcing.
4.1 Data and Variables
The sample includes annual data of 15 industrial sectors that are pooled over
the years 1995-2002. The sectors are classiﬁed according to the European NACE
system at the 2-letter level.9 The sample period starts in the year 1995, because
consistent data with respect to sector classiﬁcation are only available for the years
after Austria’s accession to the EU.
The labor demand data are taken form the Association of Austrian Social
Insurance. The skill levels are proxied by the commonly used broad deﬁnition
of production (“Arbeiter”) and non-production workers (“Angestellte”) for low-
skilled and high-skilled workers. The statistics show the wages and the employment
separately for production and non-production workers.
We deﬁne the variable international outsourcing OUTS as the share of im-
ported inputs in value added. The narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing takes the
imported inputs of the own NACE 2-letter sector into account. Some other stud-
ies are using the imported intermediate inputs a a share of the sum of domestic
8See Geishecker (2002).
9The considered sectors belong to NACE C and D.
8and imported inputs.10 The advantage of our measure OUTS is that it controls
for changes in the degree of value added, and consequently, for overall changes
in the use of intermediate goods. Since we want to analyze the importance of
outsourcing for the labor market, it might not be appropriate to look just at the
relative importance of imported inputs compared to total inputs.
As control variables, we use data on output Y , value added V A, and gross
ﬁxed capital formation K from the OCED STAN database. Since no industry-
level measure of capital stocks is available,11 we use gross ﬁxed capital formation
data to construct a measure for the capital stocks. For this calculation, we employ
the perpetual inventory method.
Technical change is proxied by the variable R&D L measuring the R&D per-
sonnel as a proportion of the sector’s employment.
See the Data Appendix for further description of the data and their sources.
4.2 Empirical Results
We estimate our equation with ﬁxed eﬀects, since any variation between units
not accounted for by the independent variables creates unobserved heterogeneity
in the model. Given that industries diﬀer from each other in the characteristics
not included in our empirical model, estimating with OLS would relegate the
omitted heterogeneity to the error term and the coeﬃcients would be biased.12
Furthermore, we also incorporate time ﬁxed eﬀects. This is important, since we
have neglected the fact, that the international outsourcing might be determined by
some foreign factors. Due to obvious reasons we cannot include these variables in
the regression. By inclusion of time dummies, we assume that the foreign variables’
impact is the same across industries and varies only over time. Moreover, there
might exist some aggregate exogenous factors that are correlated with the industry-
level relative labor demand.
Not surprisingly, statistical tests show that there is a heteroscedasticity prob-
lem plaguing our data. In order to assure the eﬃciency of diagnostic tests all
standard errors reported in the results are robust to heteroscedasticity.
We ﬁrst estimate our basic equation (2) with the wage bill share as the depen-
dent variable in Table 3.
In column (1) of Table 3, the wage bill share of the high-skilled workers WBS
is regressed on OUTS and the control variables, Y and the capital output ratio
10See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1996b) and Geishecker (2002).
11Data of capital stocks are available at the aggregated level of ISIC 1-letter sectors for
the years 1988 to 2000.
12The big advantage of the ﬁxed eﬀects versus random eﬀects is that any potential
correlation of the explanatory variables with the individual eﬀects is rendered harmless
since the ﬁxed eﬀects and therefore their correlation with the explanatory variables are
annihilated.
9Table 3: Outsourcing and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Austria
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OUTS - 0.018* - 0.030** - 0.034*** - 0.036***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Y 3.999* 4.256** 3.721* 2.704
(2.100) (1.962) (1.964) (2.031)
ln K/Y 3.440* 4.740** 4.098* 2.826
(2.059) (2.064) (2.067) (2.098)
R&D L 0.414** 0.362* 0.365**
(0.198) (0.183) (0.179)
R&D SUB 0.829*** 0.974***
(0.303) (0.311)
FDI L - 0.039**
(0.019)
constant - 3.647 - 11.677 - 4.552 10.394
(25.443) (24.341) (24.353) (25.474)
Adj. R2 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 120 120 120 120
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share = (wage bill of non-production
workers/industry wage bill)*100; OUTS = (imported inputs from own sector/value
added)*100; ln Y = log real output; ln K/Y = log [(capital/output)*100]; R&D
L = (R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value
added)*100; FDI L = (employment in foreign aﬃliates in Austria/employment)*100.
K/Y . The results suggest that outsourcing has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the
demand for high-skilled labor. Thus, rather than saving on low skilled labor as is
commonly assumed, outsourcing saves on high skilled labor relative to low skilled
labor. Furthermore, the sector’s output and capital output ratio have a positive
impact on the non-production workers’ share of the wage bill.13 This suggest that
the output elasticity is higher for high-skilled labor than for low-skilled labor.
Additionally, speciﬁcation (2) includes the R&D L as a proxy for technical
change,14 which is positively signed and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent
13 We have also run all the regressions with investments (gross ﬁxed capital formation)
instead of capital stocks, but the results are very similar.
14 The regressions are also carried out with data on R&D expenditures relative to value
added. The results for the estimated coeﬃcients (not reported here) are very similar to
those for R&D employment.
10level. This indicates that labor saving technical change shifts the demand toward
non-production workers. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of R&D L in
column (2) magniﬁes the negative impact of OUTS on high skilled labor and raises
the signiﬁcance to the 5 percent level.
We include two additional variables R&D SUB and FDI L in the regression to
control for further factors which may have put pressure on the relative demand for
skilled labor in Austria. R&D SUB measures public subsidies to the private sector
in percent of value added. The reason why we include this variable in the regres-
sion is that the government in Austria pursued an active technology policy driving
up relative wages of skilled labor in Austria. R&D SUB is supposed to control
for this policy induced eﬀect on relative wages of skilled workers.15 Compared to
other OECD countries, governmental R&D policy plays an important role in Aus-
tria. In 2001, 38.2 percent of R&D expenditures are ﬁnanced by the government,
whereas only 29.1 percent of R&D expenditures are state-ﬁnanced on OECD aver-
age. Since these state-ﬁnanced R&D expenditures are used as a policy instrument,
they might be unequally distributed among sectors. As a proxy for R&D subsidies
we use in our analysis the R&D subsidies of the state-owned research foundation
for enterprises (”¨ Osterreichische Forschungsf¨ orderungsgesellschaft”). The subsi-
dies vary from 2.3 percent of the sector’s R&D expenditures in the coke and oil
sector to 21.6 percent in the wood sector.
Table 4: Who Contributes to R&D
Financing R&D in 2001 (in percent)
Austria USA France Japan Finland
State Aid 38.2 27.8 36.9 18.5 25.5
Domestic Firms 41.8 67.3 54.2 73 70.8
Foreign Firms 19.7 - 7.2 0.4 2.5
Source: Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
The positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on R&D SUB indicates that an
increase of state-aided R&D expenditures in percent of value added by 1 percentage
point is pushing up the relative wage bill of high-skilled workers by 0.83 percentage
points. The technology policy eﬀect on the relative wage bill of skilled workers is
of much larger magnitude than the eﬀect of technical change and outsourcing.
15For the R&D policy induced eﬀect on relative wages for skilled workers in Austria see
Marin (1995). She shows that the same policy has contributed to the slowing of the speed
by which the pattern of trade moved up the technological ladder in Austria.
11Furthermore, the inclusion of R&DSUB increases the statistical signiﬁcance of
OUTS to the 1 percent level.
In the last speciﬁcation of Table 3, we include FDI L measuring the percent of
employment of foreign aﬃliates in Austria by sector. The reason why we include
this variable is that foreign ﬁrms play an important role in the R&D and trade
activity taking place in Austria. In 2001, 20 percent of R&D expenditures is
ﬁnanced by foreign ﬁrms (see Table 4). This share is the largest one among OECD
countries.16 In addition, foreign aﬃliates in Austria generate a large share of
Austrian imports. Table 5 shows, that around one third of all imports are done by
foreign multinationals in Austria. The presence of foreign ﬁrms in Austria varies
strongly according to the sector. The share of employment of foreign aﬃliates in
percent of sector’s employment ranges from 3.8 percent in the furniture sector to
70 percent in the coke and oil sector.17
Table 5: Role of Foreign Firms for Foreign Trade and the Austrian Labor
Market
1995 1998 2002
share of FDI employment in total employment 16.26 17.00 16.65
share of FDI-Imports in total imports - 21.75 32.08
Source: Own calculations based on data of the Austrian National Bank, OeNB, the
OECD STAN database, and Eurostat Comext data base.
Foreign multinationals tend to increase the relative demand for unskilled labor
in Austria suggesting that they invest in unskilled labor intensive sectors. This is
consistent with the fact that Austria is a relatively human capital poor country.18
The estimated coeﬃcient on FDI L is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
level. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of imported inputs (OUTS) and
in the share of employment in foreign multinationals in Austria lowers the relative
demand for high skilled labor by about 0.04 percentage points.
The economic impact of international outsourcing implied by these estimates
is substantial over the considered period. The observed increase in the non-
production wage bill share in the period 1995 to 2002 is 3.36. Multiplying the coeﬃ-
cient on outsourcing from column 4 by the change in outsourcing (12.67 percentage
points) and dividing this by the change in the wage bill share [(-0.036*12.67)/3.36]
16 In the EU-15 countries 7.7 percent of the R&D activity is undertaken by foreign
multinationals. See Statistische Nachrichten 6/2004, Statistics Austria.
17 The numbers show averages for 1995 to 2002.
18 For a comparison of Austria’s skill endowment with other OECD and Eastern Euro-
pean countries see Marin (2004).
12results in a negative contribution of 0.136. This implies that the wage bill share
of human capital would have increased by 13.6 percent more in the absence of
outsourcing in the last decade.
Table 6: Outsourcing and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor in
Austria
dependent variables: (1)-(3): relative wages, (4)-(6): relative employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTS - 0.155*** - 0.148*** - 0.179*** - 0.109* - 0.149** - 0.142***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.061) (0.063) (0.067) (0.051)
ln VA - 20.131** - 27.179*** - 22.592*** 67.617*** 52.529*** 66.058***
(8.557) (9.386) (8.270) (14.162) (9.758) (15.608)
ln K/VA - 17.521* - 22.064** - 19.831** 57.372*** 51.123*** 54.806***
(9.145) (9.115) (8.724) (10.280) (7.831) (11.164)
R&D L 2.637* 3.074***
(1.516) (1.073)
R&D SUB 2.349 4.923**
(1.664) (2.025)
constant 449.505*** 520.155*** 480.238*** - 721.512*** - 582.880*** - 697.668***
(104.218) (109.201) (100.009) (152.852) (106.720) (168.349)
Adj. R2 0.975 0.976 0.975 0.994 0.995 0.994
N 96 96 96 120 120 120
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies
are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative wages = (70-percentile wage of non-production
workers/30-percentile of production workers)*100; relative employment = (number of non-
production workers/number of production workers)*100; OUTS = (imported inputs from own
sector/value added)*100; ln VA = log real value added; ln K/Y = log [(capital/value added)*100];
R&D L = (R&D employment/employment)*100; R&D SUB = (R&D subsidies/value added)*100;
FDI L = (employment in foreign aﬃliates in Austria/employment)*100.
How robust are these results? A decomposition of the wage bill share into
relative wages and relative employment may deliver interesting insights. In Table
6, we replace the dependent variable wage bill share with the new dependent vari-
ables, relative wages and relative employment of high-skilled labor, respectively.
We then run similar regressions as in Table 3. The coeﬃcient on OUTS is neg-
ative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in all three relative wage
regressions and somewhat less signiﬁcant in the relative employment regressions.
The R&D measures have a strong and signiﬁcant impact on the relative em-
ployment. The R&D L ratio and the R&D SUB inﬂuence the relative employment
13of high-skilled workers positively, whereas the FDI L ratio has a strong negative
impact, which is not reported in the table. These variables, however, have only a
minor eﬀect on relative wages.
International outsourcing can explain 38 percent of the decrease in the wage
gap between the 70-percentile of the non-production workers and the 30-percentile
wage of the production workers. Relative employment would have grown by 24
percent more in the absence of outsourcing activities that occurred in the consid-
ered period of 8 years. As shown in Table 6 outsourcing has a negative impact on
relative wages, as well as on relative employment. However, while the wage gap is
decreasing, outsourcing contributes signiﬁcantly to this development, and it acts
against the rise in relative employment.
5 Multinational Outsourcing to Poland
In this section we investigate how outsourcing by foreign ﬁrms has aﬀected the
evolution of the skill-premium in Poland. We capture outsourcing of foreign ﬁrms





). This measure arises from disaggregating of the capital stock (K) into
domestic capital ( KD) and foreign capital (KFDI).19
5.1 Variables and Data
We study the relative labor demand for skilled workers in Poland on the manufac-
turing industry. Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel 20 of 23 ISIC indus-
tries over a 9 years’ period (1994-2002).21 We measure the employment of high-
skilled (low-skilled) workers as an annual average employment of non-production
(production) workers, and the wage of skilled (unskilled) workers as an annual
average gross wage of non-production (production) workers. Unfortunately, espe-
cially at the level of disaggregation we use in our empirical work, no better proxies
for high-skilled and low-skilled labor are available. Hence, the high-skilled labor
wage share is measured as the non-production workers’ wage share in the total
wage bill.
Our data allow us to separate foreign and domestic owned ﬁxed assets. 22 To
control for the restructuring processes in Polish manufacturing we add the share







20 Some numbers are not made public for conﬁdentiality reasons.
21 Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) examine a similar question for the three countries
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. However, they have data on 6 ISIC industries,
only over the period 1994 to 2001.
22 Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for lack of data could not directly measure the capital
stock in foreign ownership and thus used the number of foreign ﬁrms as a proxy. Bruno,
Crino and Falzoni (2004) measure foreign capital with foreign direct investment stock.
14of private ﬁrms in total number of manufacturing ﬁrms (PRIV ). We assume that
private enterprises have stronger incentives to rationalize and modernize their pro-
duction than their public counterparts so that their activities might have aﬀected
the relative high-skilled labor demand. Furthermore, we include the variables
R&D expenditures share in sales (R&D) and the import and export shares in
sales (M and X). R&D is supposed to account for technological improvements
and M and X capture the potential inﬂuence of international integration and of
the exposure to international competition. Finally, as the total labor cost function
condition on total output, it is common practice to include output in this type
of the regression. However, due to high correlation between output (measured by
sales) and domestic ﬁxed assets, which enters the regression in levels, we excluded
the former variable from regression. Nevertheless, accounting for industry and
time ﬁxed eﬀects helps to resolve potential problems arising from omitting output
in the regression. Thus our modiﬁed estimating equation is:
WBSHS







+ α5lnR&Dit + α6lnMit + α7lnXit + it (3)
5.2 Empirical Results
Table 7 reports the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation results for the wage share of high-skilled
labor. Columns (1) presents the basic speciﬁcation with the two independent
variables: foreign (1 + KFDI
KD ) and domestic capital (KD). Columns (2) to (4)
present the results when adding several control variables to the basic speciﬁcation.
The coeﬃcient on the foreign capital variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
in all regressions. Its magnitude ranges from 0.029 to 0.044. But what is actually
interesting is its economic signiﬁcance. Multiplying the most conservative estimate
of the coeﬃcient of the foreign ﬁxed assets (0.029) with the average growth of the
share of foreign ﬁxed assets between 1994 and 2002 (116.5 percent). The obtained
number (0.034), is the contribution of foreign capital to changes in relative demand
for skills. It implies that FDI can account for at least 34 percent of the observed
increase in non-production workers’ wage share (0.099) in the Polish manufacturing
sector between 1994 and 2002.
The coeﬃcient of domestic capital is also positive in all speciﬁcations but not
statistically signiﬁcant. The sign of domestic capital coeﬃcient corroborates the
theoretical result, that any accumulation of capital, be it domestic- or foreign-
owned, leads to an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Its statistical
insigniﬁcance, however, underlines the special role of foreign capital for the changes
in relative high-skilled labor demand.
15Table 7: Foreign Investors and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Poland
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD ) 0.044*** 0.048** 0.046** 0.029**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
ln (1 + E
FDI
ED ) 0.114* 0.141*** 0.124** 0.107***
(0.062) (0.049) (0.048) (0.039)
ln KD 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.002
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
ln PRIV 0.041** 0.036** 0.043** 0.045** 0.042* 0.050**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
ln R&D 0.008** 0.007** 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln M -0.046*** -0.053***
(0.011) (0.012)
ln X 0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.016)
year dummies yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant 0.365 -0.004 0.041 0.237 0.251 0.223 0.163 0.321
(0.332) (0.276) (0.273) (0.259) (0.335) (0.293) (0.298) (0.238)
Adj. R2 0.917 0.920 0.920 0.926 0.910 0.931 0.918 0.949
N 194 192 185 171 194 192 185 171
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are
included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share = wage bill of non-production workers/manufacturing
wage bill; ln (1 + K
FDI
KD ) = log [1 + (foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic ﬁxed assets)]; ln (1 + E
FDI
ED ) = log
[1 + (number of foreign ﬁrms/number of domestic)]; ln KD = log (domestic ﬁxed assets); ln PRIV =
log (number of private ﬁrms/total number of ﬁrms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M =
log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
The inclusion of control variables does not change the results obtained for the
basic regressors. PRIV has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the high-skilled
wage share. The result on the R&D variable suggests that the increase in the rel-
ative high-skilled labor demand was partly due to a technological upgrading. The
negative coeﬃcient on the import share can be seen from the Heckscher-Ohlin per-
spective. Given that Poland is low-skilled labor abundant compared to its trading
partners, international trade would exert a downward pressure on earnings of high-
skilled workers relative to the earnings of low-skilled workers. Nevertheless, the
result on the export share is inconclusive. Finally, the inclusion of time dummies
is crucial when analyzing the role of outsourcing for the skilled workers’ relative
16Table 8: Foreign Investors and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled Labor
in Poland
dependent variables: (1)-(4): relative employment, (5)-(8): relative wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD ) 0.083** 0.094** 0.090** 0.045 0.183*** 0.180*** 0.174*** 0.170***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.051)
ln KD 0.056 0.068 0.069 0.039 0.164*** 0.161*** 0.162*** 0.166***
(0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.035) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
ln PRIV 0.095** 0.083* 0.102** -0.023 -0.034 -0.039
(0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.052) (0.055)
ln R&D 0.027** 0.025** 0.006 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
ln M -0.119*** -0.011
(0.021) (0.056)
ln X 0.026 0.005
(0.047) (0.069)
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant -0.835 -1.010 -0.861 -0.376 -1.042 -1.902 -1.746 -1.996
(1.024) (0.907) (0.879) (0.876) (1.743) (0.826) (0.877) (1.231)
Adj. R2 0.836 0.838 0.837 0.847 0.773 0.769 0.771 0.775
N 194 192 185 171 194 192 185 171
Notes: Parameters are estimated by OLS regressions; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5)
[10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are
included but for expositional ease are not shown. Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative employment
= number of non-production workers/number of production workers; relative wage = wage of non-
production workers/wage of production workers; ln (1 + K
FDI
KD ) = log [1 + (foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic
ﬁxed assets)]; ln KD = log (domestic ﬁxed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private ﬁrms/total number
of ﬁrms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
demand in Poland. We should not forget that Poland is a transition economy with
institutions and the economic system as a whole being still “work in progress”.
The positive coeﬃcient on the year dummies suggests that the transition to mar-
ket economy, has favored high-skilled workers.
In the remaining speciﬁcations of Table 7 we substitute (1 + KFDI
KD ) with the
ratio of the number of foreign to domestic ﬁrms (1 + EFDI
ED ). An inspection of
columns (5) to (8) shows that the results are robust to this alternative measure of
outsourcing.
In Table 8 we replace the wage share of high-skilled workers as dependent
variable by decomposing it into relative employment and wages of non-production
workers. As can be seen, the result for the relative employment practically mirror
17those for the wage share. Only the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is twice as high
(in case of R&D even triple) and the year dummies loose their signiﬁcance. The
regressions with high-skilled workers’ relative wages in columns (5) to (8) give
a diﬀerent picture. The coeﬃcients on domestic capital become signiﬁcant at
one-percent level, while the inﬂuence of privatization becomes negative and not
signiﬁcant. R&D retains its positive sign but it is no more signiﬁcant, whereas
year dummies are positive and highly signiﬁcant.
The diﬀerent results on the time dummies is not surprising. Under the socialist
regime Poland had an extremely compressed wage distribution. Thus, one of the
dimensions of the transition process was the liberalization of wage setting schemes.
In the regression with relative wages signiﬁcant and positive time dummies may
reﬂect the labor market adjustments to a market economy. Meanwhile, the relative
employment underwent changes which were rather industry speciﬁc and therefore,
better captured by privatization advances. The main message of this Table, is the
positive and signiﬁcant impact of foreign capital (1+ KFDI
KD ) on relative wages and
the positive though less statistically signiﬁcant impact on relative employment of
non-production workers.
5.3 Robustness
Some studies additionally include relative wages of high-skilled workers as an inde-
pendent variable arguing that they are of importance by factor supply and demand
decisions. The relative wages of high-skilled workers are likely to be endogenous
in wage share regression, and a failure to control for this may lead to simultaneity
bias. So far we have just ignored potential inﬂuence of relative wages. Such ap-
proach, however, may cause an omitted variable bias. It is therefore necessary to
verify the robustness of the OLS estimates with instrumental variables method.
We include the second and third lags of relative wages as instruments addi-
tionally to other right hand side variables. It is also likely that foreign capital
is endogenous. Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) and Pavcnik (2003) argue that
foreign ﬁrms invest in some industries because of their high-skill intensity not the
other way round. Tests for exogeneity, indeed, indicated that both relative wages
and foreign capital variable are endogenous. Therefore, we also added ﬁrst, sec-
ond and third lags of foreign capital variable to the existing set of instruments.
For the purpose of controlling for heteroscedasticity, we apply General Method of
Moments (GMM) estimates.
Table B.2 in the Appendix shows IV-GMM results for the high-skilled workers’
wage share. First of all, the coeﬃcients on foreign capital remain positive, of the
same value and statistically signiﬁcant. The inclusion of relative wages, however,
deprived privatization and year dummies of their explanatory power. Regarding
18year dummies we have actually excluded them from the regression, since their
presence led to rejection of the joint hypothesis of correct model speciﬁcation and
orthogonality conditions. This corroborates the above result that the transition
process is partly responsible for the increase in non-production workers wage share,
because it liberalized the wage setting mechanism.
Turning to Table B.3 in the Appendix reporting IV-GMM results for relative
employment and wage, the inclusion of relative wages to the regression has similar
consequences for relative employment as for relative demand with one major diﬀer-
ence. Increasing relative wages have slightly (statistically insigniﬁcantly) retarded
the increase of relative employment of non-production workers. Regarding rela-
tive wages, their development was driven mainly by foreign capital and aggregate
shocks related to the transition process.
We also carried out the regression with all independent variables lagged one
period, as Bruno, Crino and Falzoni (2004) did in order to compare their results
with ours. The results for the two approaches diﬀer in the value of coeﬃcients of
foreign capital variable. They are higher when using lags. We also reestimated our
regressions with panel-corrected standard error estimation (PCSE), which allows
correction for contemporaneous correlation across cross-sectional units and for
autocorrelation. The results are similar to those presented in the paper.23
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the importance of outsourcing for the labor market
outcome in Austria and Poland prior to Eastern Enlargement. In contrast to other
studies on the topic we ﬁnd that outsourcing has lowered the skill premium in
Austria, the high income country, while it has increased the wage gap in Poland,
the low income country. We summarize our ﬁndings in Table 9. We also contrast
our results with the empirical ﬁndings of Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for the US
and Mexico. We report numbers for all four countries prior to Eastern Enlargement
and to NAFTA. Austria and Poland liberalized their trade and investment regime
in the 1990s after the fall of communism. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) report their
numbers for Mexico in 1975-88 and for the US in 1979-1990. Several points are
noteworthy from the Table 9.
First, Poland experienced the largest increase in outsourcing compared to Aus-
tria and the US. In the period 1994 to 2002 outsourcing in Poland (as measured
by the ratio of foreign to domestic assets) has increased by 71 percent, in Austria
(as measured by the share of imported inputs in percent of value added) it has
increased by 50 percent in the period 1995 to 2002, and in the US outsourcing
23 The results of PCSE and regressions with lagged independent variables are available
form the authors upon the request.
19Table 9: The Contribution of Outsourcing to Wage Inequality in Selected
Countries
Poland Mexico Austria USA
1994-2002 1975-1988 1995-2002 1979-1990
changes (in percent)
outsourcing 70.61a - 50.45b 50.98c
wage bill shared 34.18 21.35 8.29 19.92
relative wagese 41.39 19.63 -2.00 -
relative employmente 10.23 - 16.89 -
contribution of outsourcing (in percent)
wage bill shared 34.1 - 51.8 52.4 - 56.2 6.8 - 13.6 30.9 - 51.3
relative wages e 33.3 - 35.9 - 33.0 - 38.1 -
relative employment e 181.0 - 378.1 - 18.4 - 25.2 -
a 1+(foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic ﬁxed assets), manufacturing
b narrow deﬁnition of outsourcing: (imported inputs from own sector/value added of sec-
tor)*100, mining and manufacturing
c (imported inputs from the same sector/total non-energy material purchases)*100, manu-
facturing
d (non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to production
workers)/((non-production to production workers’ wage*number of non-production to pro-
duction workers)+(production to production workers’ wage*number of production to pro-
duction workers)) in manufacturing for Poland, USA and Mexico, in mining and manufac-
turing for Austria
e non-production to production workers in manufacturing for Poland, Germany, USA and
Mexico, in mining and manufacturing for Austria
Source: Poland: own calculations; Mexico: Feenstra and Hanson (1997); USA: calculations
taken from Feenstra and Hanson (1996); Austria: own calculations.
(as measured by the share of imported inputs in total inputs excluding energy)
has risen by 51 percent in the period 1979 to 1990. Both low income countries,
Poland and Mexico, experienced an increase in their skill premium, but Poland’s
rise in the skill premium was more than twice as large (41 percent between 1994
to 2002) compared to Mexico’s (19.6 percent between 1975 to 1988). Second, in
Austria, the high income country, relative wages for skills declined by 2 percent in
the period 1995 to 2002, while it increased by 41 percent in the period 1994 to 2002
in Poland, the low income country. We suggest in the paper that this has hap-
pened in Austria, because Austria is poor in human capital relative to its trading
partners. We also show that in the absence of an aggressive R&D policy pursued
20by the Austrian government, the decline in the skill premium would have been
much more pronounced. Third, in spite of the larger increase of outsourcing in
Poland compared to Austria, outsourcing is as important in Austria as in Poland
in explaining the evolution of the skill premium, In both countries.outsourcing
contributes roughly 35 percent to the change in the relative wage for skilled work-
ers. In other words, in the absence of outsourcing relative wages for human capital
would have declined by 35 percent less in Austria and they would have increased
by 35 percent less in Poland.
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A Data
Notes on calculation of variables
wages: Since Austria’s wages are recorded according to at most to the social
security contribution ceiling, an accurate measure of mean wages is not possible.
However, the statistics of the Association of Austrian Social Insurance report dif-
ferent percentile wages for production and non-production workers.
imported intermediate goods: As in most countries, input-output tables for
Austria are not published annually. The most recent input-output tables avail-
able are from 1995 and 2000. We estimate the input-output tables for the miss-
ing years by interpolating the input-output coeﬃcients and multiplying them by
imported inputs. These imported inputs result from the interpolate share of in-
termediate goods in total imports. We receive the total imports by transforming
HS-classiﬁcation import data at the 6-digit level to NACE categories at 4-digit
level. The import data in HS-classiﬁcation are taken from the Eurostat Comext
database. Since the data on labor market determine the level of sectoral aggre-
gation, we aggregate the imported inputs to the chosen NACE 2-letter level of
analysis. Therefore, Austria’s imports at the sectoral level formulate the esti-
mated input-output tables for the missing years.
capital stock: Gross ﬁxed capital stocks are calculated according to the perpetual
inventory method using data on gross ﬁxed capital formation (GFCF), which are
deﬂated by a general price index for investment goods.24 The initial capital stock
for the year 1994, K1994, is estimated by using the values of capital formation in
the preceding years, 1990 to 1993.
K1994 = (GFCF1990 + GFCF1991 + GFCF1992 + GFCF1993 + GFCF1994) ∗ 2
The gross ﬁxed capital stocks for the sample period are calculated according the
following simple formula, assuming a constant depreciation rate of 10 percent.
Kt = 0.9 ∗ Kt−1 + GFCFt
To check the validity of this estimation, we compare the aggregate estimate for
NACE D with the net capital stocks provided by Statistics Austria. The size of
these stocks diﬀer somewhat, but the development is very similar.
24 For this calculation see Egger (2000).
24Table A.1: Deﬁnition and Source of Variables
Variable Description Source
Austria
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ Association of Austrian
wage bill in total wage bill Social Insurance
relative wages 70-percentile non-production Association of Austrian
wage relative to 30-percentile production wage Social Insurance
relative non-production workers Association of Austrian
employment relative to production workers Social Insurance
OUTS share of imported inputs Statistics Austria
from the same NACE 2-letter (input-output table),
sector in value added, OECD STAN database
Y output (production), deﬂated OECD STAN database
by sector-speciﬁc producer price indices
VA value added, deﬂated OECD STAN database
by sector-speciﬁc producer price indices
K/Y ratio of gross ﬁxed capital OECD STAN database
stock to output
K/VA ratio of gross ﬁxed capital OECD STAN database
stock to value added,
R&D L share of R&D employment Eurostat,
in total employment, OECD STAN database
R&D SUB ratio of R&D subsidies Austrian Research
to value added Promotion Organization,
OECD STAN database
FDI L share of employment in foreign aﬃliates OeNB,
to total sector’s employment in Austria OECD STAN database
Poland
wage bill share share of non-production workers’ Polish Central
wage bill in total wage bill Statistical Oﬃce
relative wages non-production workers’ wages Polish Central
relative to production workers’ wages Statistical Oﬃce
relative number of non-production workers Polish Central
employment relative to production workers Statistical Oﬃce
(1 + K
FDI
KD ) one plus the share of foreign-owned Polish Central
ﬁxed assets in domestic ﬁxed assets Statistical Oﬃce




ED ) one plus the ratio of number of foreign ﬁrms Polish Central
to domestic ﬁrms Statistical Oﬃce
KD domestic ﬁxed assets Polish Central
Statistical Oﬃce
PRIV share of private ﬁrms Polish Central
in total number of ﬁrms Statistical Oﬃce
R&D share of R&D expenditures Polish Central
in sales Statistical Oﬃce
M share of imports in sales OECD STAN database
X share of exports in sales OECD STAN database 25B Tables and Figures
Table B.2: Foreign Investors and Demand for High-Skilled Labor in Poland
dependent variable: wage bill share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln 1 + K
FDI
KD 0.040* 0.038* 0.035* 0.031*
(0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.015)
ln W
S
W US 0.199** 0.191** 0.223*** 0.246**
(0.084) (0.091) (0.079) (0.096)
ln KD 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.009
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
ln PRIV -0.007 -0.011 -0.006
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)






year dummies no no no no
constant 0.059 0.336 -0.031 -0.027
(0.265) (0.204) (0.269) (0.251)
Centered R2 0.961 0.958 0.958 0.958
Hansen J statistic 2.424 2.716 2.047 1.769
P − value [0.489] [0.437] [0.562] [0.621]
N 124 126 120 110
Notes: Parameters are estimated by instrumental variable regressions (GMM); In-
struments: 1st, 2nd and 3rd lag of log foreign ﬁxed assets share in domestic ﬁxed
assets and 2nd and 3rd lag of log relative wage; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors are reported in parentheses;
industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are not shown.
Variables are deﬁned as follows: wage bill share = wage bill of non-production work-
ers/manufacturing wage bill; ln (1+ K
FDI
KD ) = log [1 + (foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic
ﬁxed assets)]; ln KD = log (domestic ﬁxed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private
ﬁrms/total number of ﬁrms); ln R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log
(import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
26Table B.3: Foreign Investors and Decomposed Demand for High-Skilled
Labor in Poland
dependent variables: (1)-(4): relative employment, (5)-(8): relative wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (1 + K
FDI
KD ) 0.101* 0.097* 0.091* 0.072 0.325** 0.333** 0.296** 0.385*
(0.052) (0.057) (0.050) (0.048) (0.159) (0.169) (0.148) (0.217)
ln W
S
W US -0.137 -0.157 -0.078 0.004
(0.203) (0.229) (0.191) (0.238)
ln KD 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.007 0.177 0.186 0.175 0.250
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.123) (0.134) (0.122) (0.175)
ln PRIV -0.014 -0.020 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 -0.040
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.032) (0.030) (0.042)
ln R&D 0.011** 0.011** -0.002 0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
ln M -0.046 0.124
(0.029) (0.0101)
ln X 0.023 -0.085
(0.028) (0.069)
year dummies no no no no yes*** yes*** yes*** yes***
constant -0.043 -0.045 -0.059 0.110 -2.170 -2.377 -2.195 -3.681
(0.713) (0.742) (0.717) (0.641) (2.782) (3.127) (2.812) (3.910)
Centered R2 0.903 0.903 0.880 0.882 0.816 0.808 0.829 0.827
Hansen J statistic 2.502 2.612 2.080 1.924 0.061 0.020 0.014 0.142
P-value [0.475] [0.455] [0.556] [0.588] [0.805] [0.886] [0.904] [0.707]
N 124 124 120 110 124 124 120 110
Notes: Parameters are estimated by instrumental variable regressions (GMM); Instruments: 1st,
2nd and 3rd lag of log foreign ﬁxed assets share in domestic ﬁxed assets and 2nd and 3rd lag of log
relative wage; *** (**) [*] indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 (5) [10] percent level; robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses; industry and time dummies are included but for expositional ease are
not shown. Variables are deﬁned as follows: relative employment = number of non-production
workers/number of production workers; relative wage = wage of non-production workers/wage of
production workers; ln (1+ K
FDI
KD ) = log [1 + (foreign ﬁxed assets/domestic ﬁxed assets)]; ln KD
= log (domestic ﬁxed assets); ln PRIV = log (number of private ﬁrms/total number of ﬁrms); ln
R&D = log (R&D expenditures/sales); ln M = log (import/sales); ln X = log (export/sales).
27Figure B. 1: Outsourcing, Relative Wages and Relative Employment in Aus-
tria.





























































































































































Notes: Average annual changes in percentage points (1995-2002), sectors ranked by out-
sourcing; outsourcing deﬁned in the narrow way.
Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Statistics Austria.
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Note: Average annual changes in percentage points (1994-2002), sectors ranked by
foreign ﬁxed assets share in domestic ﬁxed assets.
Source: Own calculations based on data gathered from Central Statis-
tical Oﬃce of Poland and PAIiIZ.CESifo Working Paper Series 
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